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Identifying the cognitive processes underlying tacti-
cal decision making is vital for two purposes: (a) reduc-
ing risk through improved training and (b) facilitating the 
public’s attitudes toward the legitimacy of the police and 
criminal justice system. Despite this, very little research 
has been conducted into British police decision mak-
ing involving the use of firearms. This study begins to 
address this gap by examining the impact that exper-
tise has on British police’s use-of-force decisions during 
armed confrontations. To do so, the tactical decision-
making processes of 12 expert specialized firearms 
officers and 11 novice authorized firearms officers 
during armed confrontations were compared through 
cognitive task analysis methods. Data were coded via 
categories derived from theory and patterns inductively 
emergent within the data. The results found expert spe-
cialized firearms officers to be more flexible in adaptive 
responding to situational changes, while novice autho-
rized firearms officers reported a more sequential and 
linear process of tactical decision making. In identifying 
the key features of expertise within this environment 
(“adaptive flexibility”), this study has theoretical and 
practical implications for the acceleration of authorized 
firearms officers’ expertise acquisition to bridge the 
existing gap resulting from a lack of available 
qualified operational force commanders.
Keywords: police, UK, cognitive task analysis, critical 
decision method, naturalistic decision making
Use of lethal force by police officers lies at the 
extreme edge of policing activity (Burrows, 
2007). There is a fine line between the use of 
necessary force to achieve legitimate police 
objectives and the use of excessive force: When 
an officer uses force that may be considered 
excessive, public approval for police authority 
is shaken (McDonald et al., 2003).The salience 
of tactical decision making is evident in the 
incidents that attract widespread atten-tion, 
evaluation, and criticism. For instance, the 
death of Mark Duggan, who was shot and killed 
by police in Tottenham, North London, sparked 
riots that spread across England in August 
2011. However, the consequences of failing to 
act in circumstances that pose an imminent 
threat to life could be equally critical. Therefore, 
the performance of police firearms teams must 
be efficient and accurate (Kavanagh, 2006).
Nonetheless, a range of psychophysiologic 
and cognitive factors can influence the way in 
which authorized firearms officers (AFOs) 
 perform—many of which are not often taken 
into account while planning tactical operations 
and conducting the investigations that follow 
(Kavanagh, 2006; Thompson & Lee, 2004). 
External factors (e.g., suspect aggression; loca-
tion of suspects, victims, or officers; visual and 
physical cover; and a constant reappraisal of 
potential hazards) and internal factors (e.g., 
physiologic arousal) can interact with an AFO’s 
perception and appraisal of an environment 
(Klinger, 2006; White, 2001, 2003). For instance, 
officers are more likely to unholster and dis-
charge their weapons and to do so earlier and 
more often as a result of increased external 
demand (e.g., suspect aggression) and internal 
demand (e.g., physiologic arousal; Doerner & 
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Ho, 1994; Vrij & Dingemans, 1996; Vrij, van 
der Steen, & Koppelaar, 1994).
As British police officers are not routinely 
armed, the role of AFOs who are qualified to 
carry and use firearms in Britain is highly spe-
cialized. Out of the 126,818 full-time-equivalent 
police officers in the 43 police forces of England 
and Wales, only 5,875 (4.6%) are currently serv-
ing as AFOs (Home Office, 2015a, 2015b). 
AFOs must meet entry requirements including 
high levels of physical fitness to qualify for such 
a role (Association of Chief Police Officers 
[ACPO], 2011). Before they become operation-
ally active, AFOs complete a rigorous and 
assessed training package that includes weapon 
handling, shooting skills, less lethal options, tac-
tical procedures, and scenario-based training. 
After they are qualified as an AFO, they must 
complete refresher training and assessment for 
all tactics on a regular basis (24 month), during 
which failure results in the instant revocation of 
an AFO’s firearms license (ACPO, 2011).
British AFOs are deployed only to incidents 
in which there is a perceived threat to life 
(ACPO, 2011). Circumstances that qualify for 
AFO deployment typically involve a “reason to 
suppose” that the attending officer may have to 
protect the public or oneself from a person who 
is in possession of, or has immediate access to, a 
firearm or potentially lethal weapon (College of 
Policing, 2013). Deployment can be issued by a 
strategic firearms commander or an accredited 
tactical firearms commander or through self-
deployment. An AFO can self-deploy upon 
encountering a situation where one believes that 
delay in seeking authority would be detrimental 
to public or officer safety.
Specialized firearms officers (SFOs) are a 
specialized group of AFOs who are trained in 
skills such as (a) hostage rescue, (b) specialist 
weapon and equipment use, (c) complicated 
methods of entry, and (d) prehospital trauma life 
support. SFOs volunteer themselves for the role, 
and upon initial approval by way of a rigorous 
5-day assessment, they follow a prolonged train-
ing program (18–19 weeks). SFOs receive
refresher training every 6 weeks. Incidents dealt
with by SFOs are deemed too dangerous for
standard AFO response. These incidents often
involve suspects who are mentally or  emotionally 
distressed, are under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, do not have clear goals, and resist attempts 
by others to resolve the situation. To conclude 
these incidents without incurring loss of life, 
high levels of training, skill, and operational 
expertise are required.
Klein’s (1997) recognition primed decision 
(RPD) model (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & 
Salas, 2001) suggests that an expert recognizes 
critical environmental cues that trigger ana-
logues (i.e., previously encountered similar 
experiences). This activation is thought to sup-
port decision making and reduce associated cog-
nitive demand by focusing attention and inte-
grating related information (Fiore, Ross, & Jen-
tsch, 2012; Loveday, Wiggins, Searle, Festa, & 
Schell, 2013). Recognition aids identification, 
evaluation, and implementation of action 
through reproduction of a previously utilized 
solution or through more complicated mental 
simulation and evaluation of potential options 
and associated outcomes.
Under the dynamic, ambiguous, and critical 
demands of an armed confrontation, officers will 
need “adaptive expertise” to cognitively and 
behaviorally adapt to unpredicted and dynamic 
events (Kozlowski & DeShon, 2004; Mercier & 
Higgins, 2013). Adaptive expertise refers to 
understanding when and why particular proce-
dures are appropriate or inappropriate and recog-
nizing shifts in the situation that necessitate 
adaptability (Wiltshire et al., 2014). Adaptability 
can therefore be described as an initiated behav-
ioral sequence triggered by recognition of an 
environmental cue suggesting that a change in 
tactical decision making should occur (Fiore 
et al., 2012; Verschaffel et al., 2009). This recog-
nition depends on conceptual understanding of 
cause–effect connections (insight) and the restruc-
turing of initial mental models (Fackler et al., 
2009; Klein & Jarosz, 2011).
Rasmussen’s (1976) decision ladder also pos-
its flexibility and adaptation as the defining 
 characteristics of expert decision making. The 
decision ladder comprises links between 
 information-processing activities and resulting 
states of knowledge. Whereas a rational, knowl-
edge-based, and linear behavior sequence is typi-
cally associated with novice task performance, 
experts are thought to flexibly shunt from one 
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process to the next and automatically execute pre-
set skill-based responses depending on the situa-
tional assessment (Jenkins, 2009; Naikar, 2010).
The purpose of this study was to explore 
expert tactical decision making during armed 
confrontations. Despite its critical role in effec-
tive policing, little research has been conducted 
into AFO expertise and decision making (Flin, 
Pender, Wujec, Grant, & Stewart, 2007; Kilner 
& Hall, 2005). This knowledge gap reflects dif-
ficulties gaining access to police samples, as 
well as challenges in the collection and analysis 
of police data that are ecologically valid and sci-
entifically objective. Identifying how tactical 
decisions are made and how expertise influences 
this process is vital for reducing risk within these 
complex and demanding situations and environ-
ments through training. The acceleration of 
expertise is critical owing to a lack of AFOs who 
were qualified as operational force commanders 
(OFCs) at the time that the current study was 
conducted (2013), potentially leading to non-
OFC-qualified AFOs being required to lead 
operations in their absence.
Although some authors attempted to establish 
models of police decision making amid firearms 
incidents, these models are often framed in 
terms of the outcomes of armed confrontations, 
neglecting the importance of the antecedents of 
the shoot–no shoot decision in determining out-
come and rarely exploring the importance of 
expertise (Amendola, 1995, 1996; Binder & 
Scharf, 1980; Terrill, 2005). Furthermore, cur-
rent models of firearms decision making among 
police are typically developed with routinely 
armed police forces (e.g., United States) and 
therefore almost certainly lack ecologic validity 
to nonroutinely armed forces (e.g., United King-
dom; Barton, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; Knutsson & 
Strype, 2003).
In identifying the cognitive processes under-
lying expert tactical decision making, this study 
highlights skills found to be most appropriate 
and successful in British police firearms domains, 
and as a result, instructors can concentrate their 
training accordingly (Klein & Militello, 2001; 
WBI Evaluation Group, 2007). In other profes-
sions requiring rapid decision making in risky 
environments, there has been significant research 
to understand and train operational thinking 
skills—for example, aviation (Orasanu & 
Fischer, 1997; Seamster et al., 1993) and prehos-
pital/medical emergency (Gunnarsson & Stom-
berg, 2009; Wong & Blandford, 2002).
ReseaRch appRoach
This exploratory study employed cognitive 
task analysis (CTA) methods to examine the 
expert decision making of British firearms 
officers during armed confrontations. CTA is 
a set of methods used to identify and explain 
the “mental processes involved in performing 
a task” (Klein & Militello, 2001, p. 163) that is 
cognitively complex (i.e., requiring an extensive 
knowledge base, complex inferences, and judg-
ment) and that takes place in a naturalistic envi-
ronment (O’Hare, Wiggins, Williams, & Wong, 
1998). Because AFOs are required to make 
decisions under high levels of uncertainty, time 
pressure, and risk, this sample is considered to 
serve as a paradigmatic example of naturalistic 
decision making at work (Roth et al., 2010). As 
such, CTA methods were selected as the most 
appropriate approach for generating insight and 
understanding about cognition in this real-world 
context (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; 
Tofelgrehl & Feldon, 2013).
CTA has been found to successfully support 
system operation and aid improvement through 
the development of effective training recom-
mendations in many various domains (Prasanna, 
Yang, & King, 2009), including military and 
defense operations (Riley, Endsley, Bolstad, & 
Cuevas, 2006), aviation (Endsley & Robertson, 
2002), and air traffic control (Endsley & Rodg-
ers, 1994). The results of these CTA studies 
identified which processes were most important, 
therefore ensuring their support of improved 
performance (Adams et al., 2009; Crandall et al., 
2006; Tofelgrehl & Feldon, 2013).
Successful CTA should progress through a 
number of stages (Clark, Feldon, van Merriën-
boer, Yates, & Early, 2008; Hoffman, Crandall, 
& Klein, 2008), proceeding from preparatory 
steps to knowledge elicitation, data analysis, and, 
finally, knowledge representation (Yusoff & 
Salim, 2012). Through consideration of the avail-
able CTA knowledge elicitation techniques, we 
decided that the critical decision method (CDM) 
interview protocol would be most  suitable to 
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 retrospectively examine the tactical decision-
making processes of AFOs and SFOs during a 
previous firearms incident that they considered 
to be nonroutine. The CDM (Crandall et al., 
2006; Hoffman et al., 2008) is structured as an 
intensive incident-based interview protocol that 
aims to identify the decision-making processes 
involved in the judgments made during a person-
ally experienced “challenging” incident.
The CDM interview is a multistage process 
that utilizes multiple “sweeps” through an inci-
dent. These sweeps build in intensity—from 
brief and general incident recall to an intensive 
examination guided by the creation of a visual 
timeline, identification of decision points, and 
subsequent probing and hypothetical question-
ing regarding those decision points (Hoffman, 
Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Klein & Militello, 
2001).
ReseaRch objective
The objectives of this research were to iden-
tify the exemplifying characteristics of expert 
decisional processes involved in the decision 
making of British firearms officers during armed 
confrontations to identify potential training rec-
ommendations and serve as guidance for empiri-
cal evaluation. Although we propose our find-
ings as instructional strategies, we acknowledge 
that future experimental research will need to be 
conducted to establish the effectiveness of these 
strategies. CTA qualitative research methods 
can generate meaningfully informed hypotheses 
suited to subsequent empirical testing (Crandall 
et al., 2006; Wiltshire et al., 2014). For the pres-
ent purposes, CTA methods are used as explor-
atory means to derive an integrated theoretical 
framework, which can then be tested empirically 
in traditional settings in future studies.
Method
participants
Twenty-three firearms officers voluntarily 
participated in this study, representing 20% 
of the AFOs in Merseyside Police. All were 
nationally accredited AFOs in the United King-
dom. This included 12 expert SFOs (all men) 
and 11 novice AFOs (9 men, 2 women). This 
sample size exceeds many CTA studies, which 
are typically small (n < 10) owing to the large 
amounts of qualitative data generated by these 
approaches and to the limited access to experts 
of specific fields of interest (see Crandall et al., 
2006; Wiltshire et al., 2014). The mean age 
of the expert SFOs was 46 years (SD = 5.09), 
and their length of service as firearms officers 
ranged from 7 to 21 years, with a mean and 
median of 17 years (SD = 3.63). The mean age 
of the novice AFOs was 32 years (SD = 4.59), 
and their length of service as a firearms officers 
ranged from 10 to 48 months, with a mean 
and median of 23 months (SD = 13.43) and 21 
months, respectively. Data are not available in 
the public domain to determine the representa-
tiveness of the sample in terms of age and sex. 
Prior to data collection, ethical approval was 
gained, and each participant signed informed 
consent.
Based on the assumption that expertise is 
characterized by specialized skills or knowledge 
derived from extensive experience with a 
domain (Crandall et al., 2006), the level of 
expertise required for this investigation was 
SFO-qualified participants with at least 10 years’ 
experience working as firearms officers. In con-
trast, to align with the statement that novices 
should have “minimal exposure to the domain” 
(Hoffman et al., 2008), novice AFOs were cho-
sen on the basis of having qualified as an AFO 
and therefore being competent enough to have 
done so and to subsequently have enough expe-
rience to be able to complete the CDM process 
but having ≤3 years’ experience as firearms offi-
cers (relative novice status in comparison with 
expert sample). Only 1 participant in the novice 
AFO group was qualified as an OFC and SFO; 
the rest had qualified as AFO only.
Materials
To conduct the analysis, permission was 
sought to record the knowledge elicitation ses-
sions in audio format via multiple Dictaphones 
(ALBA digital voice recorder and MP3 player: 
model number T858): one on the lapel of the ana-
lyst, one on the lapel of the participant, and one on 
the table of the room in which the interview was 
being conducted. The participant was informed 
of this procedure before signing consent forms. 
The interviews were guided by a script, and an 
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A3 blank-page pad was used to draw timelines 
of the recalled incidents. Qualitative data analysis 
software (NVivo 10; QSR International, 2013) 
assisted the analysis of the current studies and 
created a transparent and “auditable 
footprint” (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012, p. 5).
procedure
Access was granted from the head of the fire-
arms department and the chief constable (ACPO 
level approval), but emphasis was placed on the 
importance of officer anonymity. To protect ano-
nymity, the demographic information collected 
was kept to a bare minimum, and participant 
numbers were used throughout analysis. Data 
collection consisted of knowledge elicitation 
sessions via the CDM. Through the CDM script, 
each participant was asked to walk through a 
“challenging” and nonroutine armed confronta-
tion that he or she personally experienced as an 
AFO. The CDM interviews were conducted in 
the officers’ workplace. Each interview lasted 
between 1 and 2 hours.
data analysis
All knowledge elicitation session audio 
recordings were transcribed. The transcripts 
were reviewed for accuracy immediately after 
collection, utilizing interview notes, timelines, 
and any other drawings or notations, to ensure 
quality control of the final transcript and to iden-
tify any discrepancies. For the current study, the 
data analysis reflected a framework analysis 
methodology, which allowed for both a “top-
down” (theory-driven) approach and a “bottom-
up” (data-driven) identification of emergent 
patterns (Wiltshire et al., 2014).
First, the data set was read multiple times and 
cognitive issues that appeared to be relevant to 
the analysis were considered; repeated ideas 
were also noted to gain insight and to evaluate 
the data set (Crandall et al., 2006). The 23 inter-
view transcripts were then inductively coded for 
repeated ideas, which were reviewed and 
grouped into themes and subthemes. This pro-
cess was iterative and involved multiple code 
and theme revisions. Summaries of the themes, 
subthemes, and supportive narrative are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Data from the interview transcripts and field 
notes were consolidated into a decision require-
ments table (DRT) to represent key decisions 
(see Table 2). The DRT was used to document 
and organize recalled cues (a sensory signal), 
information, strategies, and practices associated 
with expertise, as well as to identify specific 
challenges, potential pitfalls, and errors typi-
cally associated with inexperience. The DRT 
helped to synthesize and integrate the data across 
the 12 recalled incidents from expert SFOs and 
the 11 recalled incidents from novice AFOs, 
revealing overall key trends (Crandall et al., 
2006).
Quality control procedures
To demonstrate the objectivity of the research 
method, analysis, and conclusions, qualitative 
assessments were tested for interrater reliability 
to quantify the level of consistency between two 
independent raters who coded 30% of the data. 
The percentage of direct agreement for initial 
independent coding of the data was 62%, and 
Cohen’s kappa coefficient was .71 (range across 
transcripts: κ = .48–.83). Based on criteria set 
forth by Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney, and 
Sinha (1999), a kappa coefficient of .71 repre-
sents a fair level of agreement beyond that due 
to chance. Instances of disagreement between 
raters were discussed, and the coding system 
was adapted accordingly. The percentage of 
direct agreement for the reconciled coding was 
92%, and Cohen’s kappa coefficient was .89 
(range across transcripts: κ = .83–.97). Based 
on the criteria of Banerjee and colleagues, the 
reconciled coding had a substantial level of 
agreement beyond that due to chance.
Results
incident demographics
Out of the 12 SFOs interviewed, 9 (75%) 
recalled spontaneous incidents to which they 
were deployed or self-deployed while on armed 
response vehicle patrol. Two (17%) recalled 
incidents that, due to circumstantial factors, 
involved a rushed and partial deployment brief-
ing, and only one recalled a preplanned opera-
tion. Recalled incidents occurred between 2000 
and 2011. Eleven incidents involved contact 
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TABLE 1: Themes and Subthemes With Supportive Narratives From the Transcripts
Theme: Subtheme 
Officers Referring 
to Subtheme, n
Sample Data Extracts 
Expert 
SFOs
Novice 
AFOs
Experiential knowledge 
 Assumptions 8 4 We generally don’t run into fights with people 
who have various issues [mental health, 
alcohol or drugs] ’cause they’re more volatile 
and more prone to doing something that’s 
unexpected. (SFO2)
Prototypes and 
 analogues
9a 6b Try your best to, to stop anything like that [7/7, 
9/11] happening, in your patch. (SFO10)
It took me back to the training course. (AFO3)
 Mental 
 modeling
11 11 I always try and preempt the “what if” factor . . . 
in a position where it’s not a surprise. (SFO4)
Try and cover any contingencies. . . .  
I was told when I first come down, when a 
job is coming in, give yourself hypothetical 
scenarios, what if, what if, what if. (AFO11)
 Typicality 11 9 You’ll pick up, as a result of the experience on 
any, er, anything that’s missing. (SFO8)
Every job is not the same but there are certain 
aspects of it that you always look for. (AFO9)
 Intuition 10 5 You could tell straight away . . . you get a bit of a 
feeling for a job. (SFO1)
A sixth sense. (AFO7)
Shared situational 
 awareness
8 0 Everyone had the same mind-set. (SFO7)
Strategies
 Control 11 1 Hadn’t put my blue’s and two’s on because I 
didn’t want to alert the suspects . . . didn’t 
want to give them any advantage on us, in 
preparing themselves to deal with armed 
police . . . a game of chess. (SFO11)
Training mode 11 5 You go into a training mode . . . just tends to 
come automatically as a result of your training. 
(SFO8)
I actually, sort of reverting to type if you like and 
reverting to training. (AFO2)
 Chunking 6 0 You’re subconsciously prioritizing. . . . That’s 
borne out of years of experience. (SFO5)
Each stop was a separate little individual 
event. . . . You’re kind of ticking the boxes. 
(SFO11)
(continued)
AdAptive Flexibility 7
Theme: Subtheme 
Officers Referring 
to Subtheme, n
Sample Data Extracts 
Expert 
SFOs
Novice 
AFOs
Adaptation
 Flexibility 12 4 The experience sort of made my decision making 
a lot quicker to say “Well I’m now not doing 
this role, I’m doing that role.” (SFO3)
Think on your feet and make a decision and look 
and be flexible. . . . Because of your training and 
experience it just kicks in to think, “No one’s 
there, I’ll go there and do my job there.” (SFO9)
 Confidence  9  5c I was very well trained. . . . Definitely the 
experience helped without a doubt. (SFO11)
As opposed to training, this was difficult for 
me. . . . I didn’t have the experience. . . . I was 
working out of my comfort zone. (AFO1)
Sought the opinion of someone who was at the 
back with me who had more experience. (AFO6)
Instead of, I suppose you could say asking 
permission I would probably say I think I 
should go here because of this . . . more 
confident in my own judgement. (AFO6)
 Defensive 
 adaptation
 8 1 It’s fight or flight isn’t it? . . . It’s survival. (SFO2)
I thought, “Oh, **** me, I’m gonna’ die.” . . . 
What it boiled down to was me or him. 
(SFO11)
Note. AFO, authorized firearms officer; SFO, specialized firearms officer.
aPrototype.
bAnalogue.
cSeeking verification.
TABLE 1: (continued)
with the suspects, and only one was resolved 
without direct engagement with a suspect. In 
this case, the suspect had already left the scene 
before police arrival; however, this informa-
tion was known only retrospectively; therefore, 
every incident recalled involved potential sus-
pect contact.
All 11 novice AFOs recalled spontaneous 
incidents to which they were either deployed by 
the force incident manager via the back-to-back 
radio transmission system or were self-deployed 
upon hearing the details of the incident through 
the radio while on armed response vehicle 
patrol. Two participants were required to act as 
the OFC during the recalled armed confronta-
tion; however, neither was formally trained to 
perform this role at the time of the incident 
(owing to a lack of qualified OFCs available to 
lead the operation). Both incidents were resolved 
with the security of a trained OFC available to 
verify the participants’ decisions; however, in 
both cases, the participant continued the role of 
OFC until the conclusion of the incident. Nine 
(82%) officers recalled an incident in which a 
contact with the suspect was encountered, 
whereas two (18%) recalled incidents that 
incurred no contact (i.e., suspect had already 
escaped before the police had arrived).
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TABLE 2: Decision Requirements Table
Phase
Decision Challenge Cue/Information Expert Strategy/Practice Novice Traps
Prearrival
Spontaneous 
deployment, 
uncertainty, 
environmental 
challenges
Visual cues, audio 
intelligence feeds, 
suspect’s previous 
offenses or 
emotional/mental 
health/intoxication, 
previous knowledge 
of suspect/case
Situational awareness and 
assessment, instinct, 
assumptions, and 
expectations based on 
prototypes, predictive 
mental modeling, and 
contingency planning
Lack of previous 
knowledge to inform 
mental modeling, 
assumptions, and 
expectations
Arrival and contact
Ascertaining control 
over the situation
Visual assessment of 
the suspect (attitude, 
demeanor, likelihood 
of compliance)
Maintaining covert tactics 
for an advantage on 
the suspect, initial 
dominance/aggression, 
typicality, and anomaly 
recognition
Rushing in—lack 
of situational 
reassessment
Dynamic Fast-paced changes in 
environmental cues, 
suspect assessment, 
and intelligence
Tactical action based 
on training mode, 
adaptation, and 
flexibility aided by 
mental modeling and 
preparation
Defied expectations, 
reluctance to adapt
Situational limitations Lack of resources, 
equipment, or 
training
Adaptation, tactical 
dominance, shared 
situational awareness
Seeking verification, lack 
of confidence
Threat to life, contact, 
shoot–no shoot
Visual assessment of 
suspect aggression, 
presentation of a 
weapon, knowledge 
of suspect intent/
capability, increased 
physiologic arousal, 
and perceptual 
changes
Slowed perception—time 
to react, controlled 
adrenaline—faster 
reactions and stronger 
disposition, narrowed 
focus on hands (location 
of threat), cover, safety 
in numbers
Uncontrolled adrenaline 
response, speeded 
time—rushed and 
time-pressured 
decisions
Time pressure, 
responsibility
High speed, potential 
suspect escape
Best fit (fast response 
over optimal but timely 
decisions), chunking, 
predictive-consequence 
mental modeling
Tactics not yet conducted 
automatically—active 
analogue recall needed 
to guide action.
Postincident
Scene preservation, 
handover
Lack of pressure Standard operating 
procedures, hindsight, 
and hypotheticals
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Qualitative Results
The incidents described by expert SFOs 
and novice AFOs could be broadly split into 
three general phases: prearrival, arrival/contact 
(active involvement of tactical performance 
or contact with a suspect), and postincident. 
In general, expert SFO decisional processes 
were not consistently distinct across the phases 
in a linear manner but were instead applied 
flexibly throughout the armed confrontation. 
Expert SFO decision making was adaptive to 
circumstantial demands, leading to either an 
establishment of control and typicality or a 
“tipping point” of struggle for dominance and 
perceived time-critical threat to life that initi-
ated defensive behaviors. Compared with the 
flexible experiential decisions of expert SFOs, 
novice AFOs reported a more sequential and lin-
ear process of tactical decision making, which 
involved extended verbalizations and continued 
conscious processing throughout. Flexibility 
and adaptation to dynamic and time-pressured 
changes were therefore postulated by the SFOs 
to be the distinguishing feature of expertise in 
this context.
Our analysis generated four main themes 
with related subthemes that were relevant to the 
influence of expertise in decision making during 
armed confrontation. The details of these 
themes and related subthemes are discussed 
in turn, whereas examples and supportive nar-
ratives from the transcripts for each theme and 
subtheme are provided in Table 1. Together, 
these themes reflect the importance of adaptabil-
ity to expertise in this context. In this sample, 
adaptive expertise reflects the flexible applica-
tion of experiential knowledge, strategies, and 
skills with confidence in response to situational 
demands.
Experiential Knowledge. Whether declared 
explicitly or as a guiding force behind tactical 
confidence, all expert SFOs described their 
extensive firearms experience as a positive 
influence on their situational assessment and 
tactical decision making during the recalled 
incidents. The influence of SFO experiential 
knowledge was broadly described in the utiliza-
tion of assumptions and expectations that were 
mentally modeled on the basis of personal or 
working experiences. These assumptions and 
expectations identified typicality and anomalies 
in the current set of cues and indicated appropri-
ate tactical strategies based on this assessment. 
Such processes were often described as intui-
tive and were believed to be shared with their 
partners and team.
Assumptions. The influence of SFO experien-
tial knowledge was broadly described in the uti-
lization of assumptions regarding the unfolding 
incident based on personal or working experi-
ences. Individual situational awareness of audio 
cues, visual cues, and intelligence feeds inter-
acted with previous expectations to generate 
assumptions regarding incident legitimacy, sus-
pect intention, and appropriate tactical action. In 
particular, intelligence feeds (e.g., initial report, 
background checks on the address, and suspect 
previous offenses and mental health history) 
informed assumptions of suspect intention and 
capability, which indicated expected tactical 
roles, responsibilities, and actions. These 
assumptions were predominantly influential 
during the five recalled incidents that involved 
suspects who were deemed to be emotionally or 
mentally distressed and/or intoxicated. The 
overall underlying concern when dealing with 
an emotionally or mentally distressed suspect 
was the potential negation of achieving compli-
ance as a result of an assumed unpredictability 
and lack of rationality or reasoning. This is sup-
ported by previous reports acknowledging that 
the unpredictability of these suspects typically 
negate the assumption of rational compliance 
(Police Complaints Authority, 2003; Squires & 
Kennison, 2010). Therefore, additional tactical 
consideration, caution, and urgency were 
emphasized in these cases as a reflection of the 
increased risk associated with suspect unpredict-
ability.
Prototypes and analogues. Supporting previ-
ous studies suggesting that experiences merge in 
memory with increasing expertise, nine expert 
SFOs used analogues nonspecifically as proto-
types rather than standout cases (Fackler et al., 
2009; O’Hare et al., 1998). These prototypes 
built assumptions regarding the suspect’s men-
tality, capability, and intent. In six cases, the sus-
pect was known to the SFO. This experience 
helped build strong assumptions and expecta-
tions regarding the suspect’s potential behavior.
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In contrast, six novice AFOs recalled utiliz-
ing specific analogues in their tactical decision 
making. For instance, analogues of training 
events in which a mistake was made were used 
as a reminder to be vigilant to potential error. 
Analogue recall was described as a visual pro-
cess; AFOs would picture themselves at an anal-
ogous scene of training, run through what hap-
pened in these scenarios, and marry up similari-
ties to guide predictions and preparation. One 
AFO recalled using past experiences as a “port-
folio of jobs” matched to the current context to 
identify appropriate tactical options (AFO9).
Mental modeling. Information received on 
deployment and any other further intelligence 
feeds interacted with officers’ models of typical-
ity, or “schemata” (Plant & Stanton, 2012; Plant, 
Stanton, & Harvey, 2013), to build mental mod-
els of the unfolding events. Mental model refers 
to a representation of the core relationships 
within a domain based on conceptual knowledge 
and understanding (Wiltshire et al., 2014). Men-
tal models enabled officers to consider potential 
tactical options and appropriate standard operat-
ing procedures (SOPs) in accordance with pro-
jected events, and they initiated consideration 
and preparation of associated equipment (ballis-
tic protection or weaponry).
Mental modeling was described by 11 expert 
SFOs as a preparatory process, which aided later 
adaptation (Klein & Militello, 2001; Pirolli & 
Card, 2005). Eleven expert SFOs used mental 
models to mentally simulate potential solutions 
and the associated outcomes to assess these 
options and adapt their behavior accordingly. 
This was formally acknowledged as “contin-
gency planning” and included physically prepar-
ing to deal with predicted events and outcomes 
(e.g., positioning self and equipment).
Predictive mental modeling was described as 
a preparatory skill developed over time based on 
previous knowledge, experience, and training. 
Nevertheless, all novice AFOs also described a 
process of mental modeling (i.e., “what if”), and 
for 10 novice AFOs, this involved mentally 
visualizing potential actions and “worst case” 
outcomes to prepare contingencies for such 
events. Expert SFOs and novice AFOs both 
described mental modeling as a visual process 
that directs choice; however, although expert 
SFOs exclusively discussed predictive mental 
modeling prearrival, AFOs reported mental 
modeling to be most influential on contact with 
a suspect.
Typicality. By comparing environmental cues 
to schematic models of typicality, officers were 
able to either identify a match or recognize an 
anomaly. Identifying a match between cues and 
typicality triggered procedural knowledge and 
action known to be successful in previous analo-
gous situations. In contrast, anomaly recognition 
heightened situational awareness to notice and 
address critical cues (Crandall et al., 2006; Klein 
& Militello, 2001) and therefore was crucial to 
AFO/SFO tactical decision making. Eleven 
expert SFOs reported that the ability to quickly 
recognize anomalies was accounted for by their 
experience. The most common and influential 
recognized anomaly was instances in which the 
suspect did not meet the officer’s expectations 
of compliance. As a deviation from typicality, 
noncompliance instigated suspicion of the sus-
pect’s intent.
Intuition. AFOs’ development of expertise 
was emphasized in reports of intuitive assess-
ments regarding incident legitimacy, severity, 
address, and suspect identification. This was 
described as a skill that developed over time 
with experience. Expert SFOs reported having a 
“feel” for an incident, which helped them judge 
safety, priorities, and tactical decisions. Some 
novice AFOs also reported beginning to utilize 
intuition in this way (see Table 1). Expression of 
the incident “not being right” indicated intuitive 
anomaly recognition, triggering subsequent 
redirection of attention to focus on these anoma-
lous features.
Shared situational awareness. If afforded 
time to do so, individual situational awareness 
was verbally shared among team members to 
promote interteam coordinated responses. Team 
communication often reflected a prescribed 
script of routinely practiced verbal drills, which 
confirmed that an officer was currently con-
forming to tactical expectations. Nonetheless, 
eight expert SFOs described a lack of overt com-
munication with the team during contact with 
the suspect that reflected an implicit shared 
understanding and trust with the team. As a 
result of this shared understanding, eight expert 
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SFOs said that they could make predictions 
regarding their colleagues’ actions and utilize 
these predictions to speed up their own response 
in support. This supports literature that identifies 
expert team decision making in terms of shared 
cognition and shared mental models, which rely 
on a common knowledge base and aim (Cannon-
Bowers & Salas, 2001; Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 
2008; Sonesh, Rico, & Salas, 2013). Further-
more, as an alternative to verbal discussion, 
expert SFOs sometimes established and 
exchanged visual communication with one 
another to ascertain their safety, shared knowl-
edge, and collaborative understanding. A lack of 
ability to establish this visual communication 
resulted in a sense of isolation and vulnerability.
Strategies. Experiential strategies included 
the active pursuit of control, a reliance on an 
automated “training mode,” and a process of 
“chunking” that involved compartmentalizing 
and prioritizing tasks.
Control. Ascertaining a level of control over 
the incident was repeatedly reported by 11 
expert SFOs to be a prioritized aim. For expert 
SFOs, a lack of control reflected a lack of pre-
dictability, on which the likelihood of a success-
ful and safe conclusion was presumed to be reli-
ant. Having sight of the suspects while working 
within a prescribed and familiar tactic enabled a 
greater sense of control. Ascertaining physical 
control of the suspects signaled an end of the 
immediate perceived threat and instigated 
postincident considerations.
To ascertain early incident control, expert 
SFOs initially used covert tactics. Covert meth-
ods allowed SFOs to be completely prepared to 
enforce a tactic within a highly controlled and 
rehearsed framework. By alerting the suspect to 
the ongoing police operation, six SFOs feared 
that “blowing the job” would give the suspect 
preparation and reaction time to escape or pose a 
lethal threat. Initial police dominance on arrival 
was reported by 10 expert SFOs as a method of 
establishing early compliance to ease the pres-
sure of the subsequent phases by negating 
unplanned, responsive, and therefore more risky 
methods and outcomes.
Whereas 11 expert SFOs heavily emphasized 
gaining and maintaining control as the strategy 
behind their tactical decisions, only one novice 
AFO discussed this. Yet, despite a lack of 
explicit discussion of this issue, novice AFOs 
did prioritize covert methods as a means to 
maintain an advantage over a suspect and to 
reduce the opportunity to escape.
Training mode. Through repeated practice, 
certain behaviors are automatically initiated in 
response to specific situational cues without 
conscious cognitive deliberation (Shachak, 
Hadas-Dayagi, Ziv, & Reis, 2009). Supporting 
this, if situational assessment indicated that con-
trol was achievable, officers from both samples 
(11 expert SFOs and 5 novice AFOs) automati-
cally reverted to tactical responses in accordance 
with SOPs (referred to as “training mode”). 
Because they require little monitoring, auto-
matic responses are fast and efficient, freeing 
limited cognitive resources to consider other 
aspects of the incident (e.g., situational assess-
ment, recognition of critical cues, and adapta-
tion). Training mode was more readily utilized 
by expert SFOs than novice AFOs, although 
only up to a tipping point of a perceived imme-
diate threat to own life, which instead automati-
cally initiated defensive behavioral responses.
Chunking. Seemingly endless lists of consid-
erations and simultaneously occurring events 
and tasks were described to generate an over-
whelmingly high level of perceived cognitive 
demand (referred to as “spinning plates”; AFO9). 
As a result of this overwhelming demand, six 
expert SFOs reported chunking (Gobet et al., 
2001) the incident into separate tasks to be dealt 
with of priority. This chunking process helped 
expert SFOs identify and prioritize tasks, reduc-
ing cognitive demand while serving to highlight 
anomalies and tasks to be addressed: It increased 
situational awareness. Supporting naturalistic 
decision making claims of an expert “in-built pri-
oritization” scheme of environmental cues 
(Seamster et al., 1993), prioritized judgments 
were made subconsciously and quickly as an out-
come of SFOs’ expertise. Novice AFOs did not 
report this strategy in their description, indicating 
a discrepancy among the strategies across differ-
ing levels of expertise.
Adaptation. Armed confrontations involve 
highly dynamic and changeable threats; there-
fore, in addition to tactical proficiency to take 
immediate action (i.e., “training mode”), officers 
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must be prepared to behaviorally adapt. All 12 
expert SFOs referred to adaptations in their deci-
sions, roles, positions, and tactical actions. Most 
adaptation reported was made in response to situ-
ational limitations (e.g., threat to own life, time 
pressure, and resource strategies). Threat to own 
life resulted in adaptations such as sacrificing 
speed for safety, whereas time-pressured adapta-
tions included going without a preferred (pri-
mary) weapon or quickly implementing tactics in 
a nonpreferred location to effect a quick arrest. 
Sometimes, this adaptive need meant resorting to 
a satisfying “best fit” option to avoid “worst 
case” outcomes.
Flexibility. Through experiential knowledge, 
SFOs were aware of the unpredictability of 
armed confrontations and could recognize when 
they needed to be flexible to changing circum-
stantial demands and adapt their decisions, roles/
positions, and tactical actions accordingly (i.e., 
deciding to enter a house as a team of two, rather 
than contain it and wait for further resources, in 
accordance with policy and guidelines based on 
the intelligence of an injured victim inside). 
Whereas expert SFOs intuitively recognized a 
need for flexibility and implemented adaptation 
quickly, novice AFOs relied more heavily on 
SOPs and were reluctant to implement change. 
For example, one novice AFO described how, 
following SOP guidance toward baton gun avail-
ability and access, he or she prioritized this in 
the recalled situation. However, in hindsight, 
this participant declared that he or she would not 
do so again based on experience that freedom of 
movement and speed in that situation were more 
advantageous than access to use a baton gun.
Confidence. Confidence enabled expert SFOs 
to be flexible with tactics or decisions and to do so 
quickly. In contrast, novice AFOs were more cau-
tious in their tactical decision making and reluc-
tant to adapt, preferring to act within a prescribed 
tactical framework despite contextual redundancy. 
Novice AFOs were able to recognize anomalies 
and identify when SOPs could no longer be 
adhered to under the demands of the armed con-
frontation; however, they were not always confi-
dent enough to adapt to these demands. Instead, 
novice AFOs dealt with their inexperience by 
seeking verification before implementation of a 
decision from a more experienced officer.
Five novice AFOs sought verification from 
an officer of higher authority or with more expe-
rience before implementing a tactical decision 
or action. This “safety net of other, more experi-
enced colleagues” (AFO1) acted as a “cushion” 
(AFO9) to verify decision making. Such verifi-
cation involved “appraising ideas” (AFO2), 
assessing response appropriateness (checking 
for glaring mistakes), and reassurance. One offi-
cer described this process through the analogy of 
a child looking to an adult for verification of her 
or his answer when learning a new word (AFO4).
Six novice AFOs acknowledged that, since 
the recalled armed confrontation, their confi-
dence had grown. This increase was described 
as a predicted behavioral change—from seeking 
verification to informing teammates of decisions 
and enforcing one’s own judgment, even if it 
contrasts the actions of a more experienced offi-
cer. Such changes were expected to involve the 
confidence to act quickly on one’s intuition, as 
opposed to waiting for instructions. These 
behavioral changes may reflect the development 
of trust in one’s adaptive decision making or 
mental modeling of skills over time.
Defensive adaptation. Upon a struggle to 
acquire control, expert SFOs’ threat perception 
was heightened, resulting in internal changes, 
recognition of a need for adaptation, and defen-
sive behavior. Eight SFOs and nine AFOs 
reported perceiving a direct threat to their lives 
at some point during the recalled incident. Per-
ceiving there to be a direct threat to life reflected 
three factors: (a) an increase in the suspect’s 
physical or verbal aggression; (b) the presence, 
perception, or presentation of a weapon; and (c) 
dangerous environmental conditions (a lack of 
ballistic or visual cover). Considerations of self-
preservation influenced positioning and tactical 
options. Under personal threat, tactical consider-
ations (e.g., victim, containment of house, and 
public cordons) were sacrificed in favor of pri-
oritizing a “reactionary gap” (AFO8)—that is, 
enough distance between themselves and the 
suspect to enable effective defensive behavior in 
response to any potential threat posed by the 
suspect, full focus on the threat posed to self, 
and addressing that threat. Novice AFOs 
explained that without the prioritization of their 
safety, their ability to safely conduct a tactic is 
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compromised. After surpassing a tipping point 
of a perceived time-critical threat to life, final 
shoot–no shoot decisions were instinctual defen-
sive responses based on a dual judgment of self-
preservation (i.e., “me or him”; SFO11), which 
took precedence over tactical objectives.
discussion
This study sought to compare the processes 
underlying the tactical decision making of expert 
SFOs and novice AFOs. Comparing these results 
highlighted similarities and differences. This 
information was consolidated into a DRT to 
synthesize and integrate the data across the two 
groups, which revealed key trends and dispari-
ties and highlighted potential areas of training 
(Table 2). Noted disparities included (a) a dif-
ference in coping with cognitive load, (b) SFOs’ 
confident implementation of intuitive decision 
making versus AFOs’ reliance on instruction 
and verification before decision implementation, 
and (c) SFOs’ recognition of situational changes 
and subsequent tactical adaptation versus AFOs’ 
reluctance to move away from SOPs despite 
their contextual irrelevance.
The results from both CTAs suggest adaptive 
flexibility to be a distinguishing factor of SFO 
expertise. SFOs are proposed to have adaptive 
expertise, which consists of the ability to (a) 
understand when and why particular procedures 
are appropriate or inappropriate; (b) recognize 
shifts in the situation that necessitate adaptability; 
(c) respond to situational cues that indicate the 
prioritization of speed and accuracy (Verschaffel 
et al., 2009); and (d) implement rapid, accurate, 
and contextually appropriate tactical changes 
(Kavanagh, 2006; Kozlowski & DeShon, 2004).
SFOs and AFOs both formed and tested men-
tal models and relied on schematic models of 
typicality for pattern and anomaly recognition 
(Klein & Hoffman, 1992).However, 
experience enabled expert SFOs to use these 
processes more flexibly in response to dynamic 
situational demands. For instance, both samples 
recognized situational cues that indicated the 
need for adaptation of SOPs in favor of more 
appropriate tactical actions, but expert SFOs 
understood the interactions between the cues 
and the unfolding incident and responded by 
quickly and intuitively adapting appropriately. 
In contrast, novice AFOs preferred to stick with 
SOPs for as long as possible, even when doing 
so inhibited the progress of the incident, adapt-
ing their tactical actions only if faced with an 
immediate threat to life (in which case, defen-
sive behaviors took over) or when doing so was 
verified by a more senior and experienced offi-
cer. This disparity may reflect a different reli-
ance on perceptual and conceptual knowledge 
between the two groups. Perceptual knowledge, 
which enables recognition of critical environ-
mental cues, is thought to develop much quicker 
than conceptual knowledge (the ability to inter-
pret the relevance and meaning of such cues; 
Melcher & Schooler, 2004). Supporting this, 
novice AFOs were able to see when current 
SOPs were not working (perceptual knowledge), 
but they were not always able to understand how 
they could adapt to these cues (conceptual 
knowledge; Fiore et al., 2012).
The ability to flexibly transfer and apply exper- 
 iential knowledge to new contexts depends on 
the ability to recognize the underlying principles 
that govern the situation (Verschaffel et al., 
2009). For instance, as expert SFOs described, 
mental modeling reflected a process of “picture 
developing” to (a) causally connect and explain 
the situation in a meaningful way, (b) build 
expectations, (c) direct decision making, and (d) 
prepare for subsequent actions and outcomes 
(Fackler et al., 2009). Mental models (concep-
tual knowledge) not only enabled expert SFOs 
to immediately recognize contextual changes 
and when standard tactical options were failing 
in the current context (based on previously pro-
jected occurrences, outcomes, and own 
responses) but also enabled their understanding 
of how and why they could adapt their training 
or assigned role to the identified situational 
changes (Fiore et al., 2012). Both samples uti-
lized mental modeling strategies; however, 
expert SFOs were able to quickly generate a 
larger number of hypothesized potential occur-
rences. A greater number of anticipated task-
relevant options have been found in previous 
studies to help experts predict actions and out-
comes more accurately under uncertainty, 
enabling greater flexibility to respond to pro-
jected events (Gutzwiller & Clegg, 2013; Ward, 
Ericsson, & Williams, 2013). Similarly, expert 
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SFOs described mental modeling before arriv-
ing at the scene as a preparatory process that 
aided adaptation in later phases of the armed 
confrontation. In contrast, novice AFOs’ inexpe-
rience was shown in their lack of confidence and 
reliance on verification of tactical decisions 
before implementation of adaptive action.
Reflecting Rasmussen’s (1976) decision lad-
der, novice AFOs were found to respond to the 
circumstances occurring during a firearms inci-
dent in a linear process of reasoning, as com-
pared with expert SFOs, who flexibly shunt 
from cue to cue depending on the contextual 
demands (Jenkins, 2009; Naikar, 2010). The 
parallel between these findings and Rasmus-
sen’s decision ladder suggests implication for 
training recommendations.
theoretical implications
In all, the current findings complement previ-
ous models of expertise. For instance, models 
such as Klein’s RPD model (1997, 2008) indi-
cate expertise to be exemplified by a recogni-
tional shift from analytic processes toward auto-
matic intuitive response (Benner, 2004; Lipshitz 
et al., 2001). The current results support the 
gradual development of reliance on intuitive 
processes: expert SFOs reported having a “feel” 
for an incident (SFO1), which helped them 
judge priorities and tactical decisions. In addi-
tion, almost all expert SFOs reported relying 
on an automatic response that they referred 
to as “training mode,” which echoes a simple 
match process via the RPD model (Klein, 
2008). However, the data show that under 
some circumstances (low levels of time-critical 
threat; i.e., prearrival and postincident proce-
dures), experts continue to utilize analytically 
planned processing, such as compartmentaliza-
tion (e.g., “You’re kind of ticking the boxes”; 
SFO11) and mental modeling (e.g., “I always 
try and preempt the ‘what if’ factor”; SFO4). 
Therefore, the current data suggest that exper-
tise in the context of tactical decision making 
during an armed confrontation is not defined 
by either intuitive or analytic processing alone 
but rather is exemplified as the flexibility to 
adapt one’s responses quickly and confidently 
to situational changes under increased demand. 
Consequently, this study provides support for 
the RPD model (Klein, 1997, 2008), theories of 
adaptive expertise (Mercier & Higgins, 2013; 
Verschaffel et al., 2009; Wiltshire et al., 2014), 
and Rasmussen’s (1976) decision ladder, which 
similarly sees flexibility and adaptation as the 
defining characteristic of expert decision mak-
ing (Jenkins, 2009; Naikar, 2010).
practical implications
Applications to Police Policy. The current 
study presents an evidence-based framework of 
tactical decision making during armed confronta-
tions that accounts for contextual influences on 
performance. Increased general understanding of 
the complexities involved in AFO decision mak-
ing during armed confrontations may similarly 
improve public trust in the accountability of 
police decision making around the use of fire-
arms. Although it is currently unclear whether the 
attentional capacities of AFOs can be improved, 
an awareness of the limitations of attentional pro-
cesses in high-demand situations is crucial, both 
for the AFOs themselves and for those investigat-
ing their responses (Kavanagh, 2006).
Police Training. The comparative results of 
both CTAs highlight adaptive flexibility to be 
associated with firearms expertise; therefore, it is 
suggested that police firearms training could 
enforce adaptive expertise more strongly to 
enhance AFO flexibility to changing task demands 
under high-stress conditions. Cognitive transfor-
mation theory claims that the development of 
adaptive expertise depends on pattern recognition, 
perceptual discrimination, understanding of the 
interconnections of knowledge, and the ability to 
modify knowledge to the specifics of situation or 
domain (Klein & Baxter, 2009; Wiltshire 
et al., 2014). Therefore, to promote adaptive 
expertise, development of the following is 
recommended: mental models (Gutzwiller & 
Clegg, 2013; Klein & Militello, 2001; Pirolli 
& Card, 2005; Ward, Ericsson, & 
Williams, 2012; Ward et al., 2013),sense-
mak-ing skills to recognize conflict between 
men-tal models and current situational cues 
(Fiore et al., 2012; Morrison, Wiggins, 
Bond, & Tyler, 2013), and the ability to 
revise or reject mental models in response to 
situational assess-ment (Ando, Kida, & 
Oda, 2002;  Wiltshire et al., 2014).
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Speculatively, this may be accomplished by 
systematically exposing AFOs to a variety of 
scenarios where, through guided practice and 
feedback, they can develop the models of typi-
cality necessary for rapid and accurate situation 
assessment and anomaly recognition (Fiore et al., 
2012). Exposure to high-fidelity “worst case” 
armed confrontation simulations involving situa-
tions that cannot be solved through traditional 
methods (tactical SOPs) may encourage adaptive 
flexibility to complete the exercise (Ando et al., 
2002; Williams & Westall, 2003). Future research 
is needed to fully examine how the acceleration 
of adaptive expertise can be implemented in 
practice, and any implementations should be 
fully evaluated to assess their effectiveness.
limitations
As previously discussed, because of the auto-
maticity and therefore often unconscious nature 
of expert decision making, experts in particular 
may find it difficult to articulate any intuitive 
processes via interviewing techniques (Feldon, 
2010; Smink et al., 2012; Tofelgrehl & Feldon, 
2013). Whereas CTA has been shown to succeed 
in extracting up to 43% more decision-based 
performance-relevant information from experts 
than standard interview protocols (Clark & 
Estes, 1996), it must be acknowledged that as 
a form of interview methodology, CTA is likely 
to suffer from the same limitations in terms of 
extraction of intuition. However, the publica-
tion and high citation of reports that utilize 
interview methods such as CTA for the extrac-
tion of expert intuition in a variety of decision 
making environments (i.e., Benner, 2004; 
Klein, 1997, 2001; Klein et al., 1998;Wong & 
Blandford, 2002) support the use of interview 
methods for the study of expertise
The length of time passed between the inci-
dent and expert SFOs’ recall was substantial in 
some cases and therefore could present a meth-
odological issue; however, the recall of unveri-
fied retrospective events must be considered as a 
possible limitation of both CTAs. Previous stud-
ies have used the CDM technique to interview 
participants regarding the decisions made during 
an observed event (Brezovic, Klein, & Thordsen, 
1990). Therefore, to combat the possibility of 
memory fragility in the recall of unverified 
 retrospective armed confrontations, a follow-up 
study is proposed to examine the decisional pro-
cesses occurring during the completion of a 
recorded firearms training exercise.
It should be noted that analysis is based on 
only 23 participants, all recruited from a fire-
arms department within the same British police 
force. Although it is acknowledged that general-
izability is a shortcoming, AFOs are a specific 
group of decision makers, and as such, general-
ization to a larger population is not a major con-
sideration, as findings are to be applied to these 
particular decision makers (McAndrew & Gore, 
2013; Roth et al., 2010). More relevant, it is pos-
sible that these results represent force-specific 
novice AFO and expert SFO tactical decision 
making, and a larger sample generated across 
UK-wide forces could help decipher the gener-
alization of these findings to UK AFO tactical 
decision making more accurately (Smick et al., 
2012). Nonetheless, given the limited time avail-
able and difficulties in gaining access to such a 
specialized group of officers, this was not pos-
sible. Future research may seek to clarify these 
issues through replication with officers across 
different forces to examine relationships and 
whether they exist in different policing areas.
conclusion
Similar processes were reported across the 
two groups, whereas strategies used, tactical 
implementation, and confidence differed. Expert 
SFOs had a great deal of experiential knowledge. 
With this knowledge, expert SFOs were able to 
(a) categorize incidents, (b) recognize anoma-
lies, (c) have awareness of and be able to quickly
adapt to the dynamic environment, (d) use their
training unconsciously and automatically, and
(e) demonstrate confidence in their abilities.
Confidence in one’s ability enabled expert SFOs
to utilize experiential strategies that freed cog-
nitive resources, affording implementation of
adaptive tactical decisions and actions assessed
through mental modeling. Novice AFO com-
parison highlighted the gradual development of
confidence in one’s own ability. These findings
can be implemented into AFO training, thereby
highlighting the importance of these cognitive
processes as a contributor to expert tactical deci-
sion making during firearms incidents.
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